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Abstract
We establish a security proof of frequency-time coding quantum key distribution (FT-QKD)
protocol by showing its connection to the squeezed state quantum key distribution protocol, which
has been proven to be unconditionally secure. We also extend the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD
protocol to an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice. Further-
more, we propose a correlated frequency measurement scheme of entangled photon pair by using
time resolving single photon detector. Simulation results show that the FT-QKD protocol can be
implemented with today’s technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
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I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum information is quantum key distribution
(QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechan-
ics [1, 2]. While QKD has been conducted through both optical fiber and free space, the
availability of a worldwide fiber network suggests that single mode fiber (SMF) could be the
best choice as the quantum channel for practical QKD systems.
Two basic requirements on the quantum channel are low loss and weak decoherence.
While the loss of standard SMF is relatively low, the decoherence introduced by a long
fiber link depends on the coding scheme. Most practical QKD systems are based on either
polarization coding or phase coding. Unfortunately, these two coding schemes suffer from
polarization and phase instabilities in optical fiber induced by environmental noise. On the
contrary, the frequency-time coding QKD (FT-QKD) scheme proposed in [3] is intrinsically
insensitive to the polarization and phase fluctuations. This suggests that the FT-QKD could
be a more robust solution in practice.
In [3], the security of the FT-QKD protocol was intuitively interpreted as a result of
the energy-time uncertainty relation. In this paper, we provide a security proof of the FT-
QKD protocol by connecting it to the squeezed state QKD protocol [4, 5] whose security
against the most general attack has been proven in [6]. This connection is built upon the
observation that the frequency and arrival time of a photon is connected to its momentum
and spatial position. In quantum mechanics, the commutation relation between position
and momentum operator is the same as that between the two quadratures of an oscillator.
So, mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD, thus Gottesman-
Preskill’s security proof in [6] can be applied. We remark that one nice feature of Gottesman-
Preskill’s proof is that both the BB84 QKD protocol and the squeezed state QKD protocol
(thus the FT-QKD protocol) are studied under the same scope. This allows us to apply
many important results developed in the BB84 QKD, such as decoy state idea [7] and the
squash model of threshold single photon detector (SPD) [8], into the FT-QKD protocol.
We remark that single-photon continuous-variable QKD protocols exploring the spatial
freedom of photons have also been investigated [9]. However, it could be difficult to imple-
ment those protocols over a long distance.
Section II is a review of the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol [3] . In Section
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III, we show that mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD,
therefore Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof [6] can be applied. In Section IV, we propose
an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice. In Section
V, we discuss the feasibility of implementing the FT-QKD with today’s technology. We end
this paper with a brief conclusion in Section VI.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PREPARE-AND-MEASURE FT-QKD PROTO-
COL [3]
Following the cryptographic convention, the two legitimate users in QKD are named as
Alice and Bob, and the malicious eavesdropper is named as Eve. In the prepare-and-measure
FT-QKD, Alice randomly chooses to use either “frequency-basis” or “time-basis” to encode
her random bits. In the frequency-basis, one or more random bits can be encoded on the
central frequency of a single-photon pulse which has a very small linewidth; In the time-
basis, one or more random bits can be encoded on the time delay (defined relatively to a
synchronization pulse) of a single-photon pulse which has a very small temporal duration.
Upon receiving Alice’s photon, Bob randomly chooses to measure either its frequency or
its arrival time. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their bases
through a public authenticated channel and they only keep the results when they happen to
use the same basis. Given the conditional variance of Bob’s measurement results is below
certain threshold, they can further generate secure key by performing error correction and
privacy amplification.
A schematic diagram of the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol is shown in Fig.1.
In Fig.1, Alice holds two transform-limited single photon sources: S1 (for frequency coding)
can generate single-photon pulses with a narrow spectral bandwidth (but a large temporal
duration); S2 (for time coding) can generate single-photon pulses with a small temporal
duration (but a broad spectral bandwidth). We assume that both S1 and S2 have Gaussian
spectra and their spectral bandwidths are σω1 and σω2, respectively. In the frequency-basis,
Alice encodes her bits by randomly modulating the central frequency of S1. In the time-basis,
Alice encodes her bits by randomly modulating the time delay of S2. A beam splitter (BSA
in Fig.1) is employed to combine the outputs of S1 and S2 together. At Bob’s side, passively
determined by another beam splitter (BSB in Fig.1), he can either measure the arrival time
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the FT-QKD system: S1-narrowband frequency tunable single pho-
ton source; S2-broadband single photon source with tunable time-delay; BSA/BSB-beam splitters;
TSPD-time-resolving single photon detector; DG-dispersive grating; SPDA-single photon detec-
tor array.
of the incoming photon with a time-resolving SPD, or its frequency (wavelength) with a
dispersive element (such as a dispersive grating which is shown as DG in Fig.1) followed by
a SPD array (SPDA).
Given the frequency-modulation profile of S1 matching with the spectrum of S2 and the
time-delay-modulation profile of S2 matching with the temporal pulse shape of S1 (as shown
in Fig.2), it can be shown that the density matrix of a frequency-coding photon is identical
to that of a time-coding photon, thus Eve cannot distinguish them from each other [3].
The security of the FT-QKD protocol can be intuitively understood from the energy-time
uncertainty relation which puts a constraint on Eve’s ability to simultaneously determine
both the frequency and the arrival time of a photon. Mathematically, Eve’s time uncertainty
∆
(E)
t and frequency uncertainty ∆
(E)
ω (defined as root mean square (RMS) values) satisfy
the following relation
∆(E)ω ∆
(E)
t ≥
1
2
(1)
On the other hand, Bob’s measurement uncertainties are not bounded by equation (1) since
he randomly measures either the arrival time or the frequency of each incoming photon but
not both. Alice and Bob can establish an information advantage over Eve by post-selecting
the cases when they happen to use the same bases, thus secure key distribution is possible.
The FT-QKD protocol can be summarized as follows:
1.Alice generates a binary random number a. If a = 0, she generates another random
number b from the Gaussian distribution f1(b) = (piσ
2
ω2)
−1/2exp[−(b − ω0)2/σ2ω2]; then she
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the frequency (time) domain modulation profiles of Alice’s single photon
sources. Top Left: solid lines-the spectra of S1 corresponding to different frequency shifts; dashed
line-the probabilistic distribution of the frequency-modulation profile which matches with the spec-
trum of S2 shown in Bottom Left. Top Right: the pulse shape of S1 in time domain. Bottom Left:
the spectrum of S2. Bottom Right: solid lines-the pulse shapes of S2 corresponding to different
time shifts; dashed line-the probabilistic distribution of the time-modulation profile which matches
with the pulse shape of S1 shown in Top Right.
sets the central frequency of S1 to b and fires it. If a = 1, Alice generates a random number b
from the Gaussian distribution f2(b) = (pi)
−1/2σω1exp[−σ2ω1b2]; then she sets the time-delay
of S2 to b and fires it.
2.Upon receiving Alice’s photon, Bob randomly chooses to measure either its arrival time
or its frequency (wavelength).
3.Alice and Bob repeat step 1 and step 2 many times.
4.Through an authenticated classical channel, Alice and Bob post-select the cases when
they use the same bases. After this step, Alice and Bob share a set of correlated Gaussian
variables, which are called “key elements”.
5.Alice and Bob convert the“key elements” into binary bit strings.
6.Alice and Bob can estimate the maximum information acquired by Eve from the ob-
served quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER is below certain threshold value, they
can future perform error correction and privacy amplification to distill out a secure key.
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III. SECURITY OF THE FT-QKD PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide a security proof of the FT-QKD protocol by connecting it to
the squeezed state QKD protocol [5]. Section III.A is a brief review of the squeezed state
QKD protocol [5] and Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof [6]. In Section III.B, we apply
Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof to the FT-QKD implemented with perfect single photon
sources and ideal photon-number-resolving SPDs. In Section III.C, we discuss the FT-QKD
implemented with weak coherent sources (attenuated laser source) and practical thresholds
SPDs.
A. The squeezed state QKD and its security proof
In the prepare-and-measure squeezed state QKD protocol [5], Alice randomly prepares
a single mode electromagnetic field either squeezed at amplitude quadrature (X1) or phase
quadrature (X2). For a X1-squeezed state, its amplitude quadrature is well defined (while
its phase quadrature has a large variance). Alice can randomly modulate the mean value of
amplitude quadrature 〈X1〉 to encode her bits; Similarly, for a X2-squeezed state, its phase
quadrature is well defined (while its amplitude quadrature has a large variance). Alice can
randomly modulate the mean value of phase quadrature 〈X2〉 to encode her bits. At Bob’s
end, he randomly chooses to measure either the amplitude quadrature or phase quadrature
with a homodyne detector. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare
their bases for each transmission and only keep the results when they happen to use the
same basis (“key elements”). If the 〈X1〉-modulation profile of theX1-squeezed state matches
with the distribution of X1 of the X2-squeezed state, and the 〈X2〉-modulation profile of the
X2-squeezed state matches with the distribution of X2 of the X1-squeezed state, then Eve
cannot tell which type of squeeze state Alice has prepared.
Quantum mechanically, the two operators X1 and X2 are not commute with each other
thus the uncertainty relation applies: X1 and X2 cannot both be defined to arbitrarily high
accuracy for a given quantum state. This is the foundation of the security of the squeezed
state protocol. Its security against the most general attack is given by Gottesman and
Preskill in [6].
Instead of presenting its details, we simply remark that Gottesman-Preskill’s security
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proof employs quantum error-correcting codes that encode a finite-dimensional quantum
system in the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space of an oscillator [10]. Note, in [6], a pair of
dimensionless position and momentum operators q and p are used to encode information.
The commutation relation between q and p is given by
[q, p] = i (2)
and the corresponding uncertainty relation is
∆(rms)q ×∆(rms)p ≥
1
2
(3)
where ∆
(rms)
q and ∆
(rms)
p are defined as RMS values.
To convert key elements into binary random numbers, the following distillation protocol
is adopted [6]: Alice broadcasts her data modulo
√
pi, i.e. m = mod(SA,
√
pi); Alice and Bob
subtract m
√
pi from their data and correct the remainders to the nearest multiples of
√
pi;
They extract binary bit values based on whether the above integers are even or odd.
The secure key rate R of the squeezed state QKD is given by [6]
R =
1
2
[1− f(e)H2(e)−H2(e)]. (4)
Here the factor 1/2 is due to the fact that half of the time, Alice and Bob use different bases.
e is the observed QBER, f(x) is the bidirectional error correction efficiency, and H2(x) is
the binary entropy function, which is given by
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). (5)
Given a perfect error correct code (f(x) = 1), Equation (4) shows that as long as the QBER
is below 11%, secure key distribution is possible.
The QBER in (4) is determined by [6]
e ≤ 2∆
pi
exp(−pi/4∆2) (6)
where ∆2 is a measure of the conditional variance of key elements,
Prob(qA − qB) = 1√
pi∆2
exp[−(qA − qB)2/∆2] (7)
Here we assume the conditional variance in q-basis (∆2q) is the same as that in p-basis (∆
2
p).
In the case of ∆2q 6= ∆2p, by slightly modifying the protocol and defining ∆2 = ∆q∆p, (6)
is still applicable [6]. In Section III.B, we apply Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof to the
FT-QKD protocol.
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B. The FT-QKD based on perfect single photon sources and ideal photon-number-
resolving SPDs
We first study the case where Alice holds perfect single photon sources and Bob has ideal
photon number-resolving SPDs.
Note that the energy time uncertainty relation, which has been used to intuitively under-
stand the security of the FT-QKD protocol, is fundamentally different from the one applied
to a pair of non-commuting operators, such as q and p. This is because in quantum me-
chanics, conventionally, time is not treated as an operator. We remark that there have been
great efforts on establishing a “time-of-arrival” operator in quantum mechanics [11]. Here,
instead of touching this deep question in quantum physics, we simply take an operational in-
terpretation of the time and frequency measurement. In practice, it is reasonable to assume
that the speed of light in Alice and Bob’s station is well defined and cannot be manipulated
by Eve. By choosing a suitable time reference, the arrival time t and the frequency ν (or
wavelength λ) of a single photon are related to its spatial position X and wave vector KX
(which is proportional to its momentum PX as PX =
h
2pi
KX) by
X = ct/n (8)
KX =
2piν
c/n
=
2pin
λ
(9)
where n is the refractive index, h is the Planck constant and c is the speed of light in vacuum.
Note that X and KX satisfy the same commutation relation as p and q do
[X,KX ] = i (10)
So, mathematically, the FT-QKD is equivalent to the squeezed state QKD and Gottesman-
Preskill’s security proof in [6] can be applied.
In practice, there are some technical issues to be resolved. First of all, in the squeezed
state QKD, Bob uses a homodyne detector to detect Alice’s signals. Regardless of the
transmission loss, the homodyne detector always outputs an effective detection result. On
the other hand, SPDs are employed in the FT-QKD. A SPD either detects nothing or an
intact photon. Thus, in the FT-QKD, for each transmission, Bob has to inform Alice whether
he detects a photon or not. Alice keeps her data only when one of Bob’s SPDs clicks. To
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take into account of this “post-selection” process, we can define an overall gain Q1 as the
ratio of the number of Bob’s detection events to the number of signal pulses sent by Alice.
Equation (4) is then replaced by
R =
1
2
Q1[1− f(e1)H2(e1)−H2(e1)]. (11)
Here, we use subscript 1 to emphasis the fact that in the FT-QKD, only single-photon signals
contribute to the secure key. Note (11) is the same as the secure key rate of the BB84 QKD
protocol given in Shor-Preskill’s security proof [12]. This is because the same approach has
been adopted in the security proofs of [12] and [6].
Secondly, in [6], it is assumed that the conditional variance defined in (7) is solely de-
termined by the squeeze factor of the source while the contribution of detection system has
been neglected. This is reasonable in the case of the squeezed state QKD because it is very
difficult to prepare highly squeezed state in practice. However, in the FT-QKD, the un-
certainty in quantum state preparation could be much less than that in the quantum state
detection. For example, both a narrow-band laser pulse with a spectral linewidth much less
than 1pm and an ultrashort laser pulse with a temporal duration less than 1ps can be easily
generated in practice. On the other hand, achieving a temporal resolution better than 10ps
or a spectral resolution better than 10pm in single photon detection are very challenge. So,
in this paper, we assume that the conditional variance defined in (7) is determined by the
finite temporal and spectral resolutions of the detection system.
C. The FT-QKD protocol based on weak coherent sources and threshold SPDs
The security analysis in Section III.B is based on the assumption that Alice has perfect
single photon sources and Bob holds ideal photon number resolving SPDs. Unfortunately,
these ideal devices are not available yet. A more practical approach is to implement the
FT-QKD with weak coherent sources (heavily attenuated laser sources) and threshold SPDs
(which can distinguish vacuum from non-empty pulses, but cannot resolve photon number).
Fortunately, security proofs of the BB84 QKD protocol implemented with weak coherent
source and threshold SPD have been developed. As we have remarked before, one nice
feature of Gottesman-Preskill’s proof [6] is that both the BB84 QKD protocol and the
squeezed state QKD protocol (thus the FT-QKD protocol) are studied under the same
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scope, so many results developed in the BB84 QKD protocol can be applied to the FT-QKD
protocol directly. Instead of presenting details of previous results, we simply remark that the
decoy state idea [7] can be applied to a FT-QKD protocol implemented with weak coherent
sources and the squash model of SPD [8] could be incorporated to resolve the security issue
of using threshold SPDs.
The FT-QKD protocol is interesting in principle. However the system shown in Fig.1 is
too complicated to be attractive in practice. In Section IV, we extend the FT-QKD to an
entanglement based scheme. In Section V, we discuss the feasibility of implementing the
FT-QKD with today’s technology.
IV. THE ENTANGLEMENT BASED FT-QKD PROTOCOL
The prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol shown in Fig.1 can be extended into an
entanglement based QKD protocol, as shown in Fig.3. A source generating energy-time
entangled photon pairs can be placed either at Alice’s station or between Alice and Bob.
The energy and time of the two photons in the same pair are Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
[13] correlated. One photon from each EPR pair is sent to Alice and the other one is sent
to Bob. Passively determined by a beam splitter, Alice (Bob) randomly measures either
the arrival time or the frequency (wavelength) of each incoming photon. After the quantum
transmission stage, Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases for each photon pair and
only keep the results when they happen to use the same basis. The distillation protocol for
the entanglement FT-QKD is the same as the one for the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD.
The entanglement based FT-QKD is closely related to the squeezed state QKD protocol
implemented with two mode Gaussian entangled squeezed state, whose security has also
been proven in [6].
In practice, the above energy-time entangled photon pairs can be generated through
nonlinear optical processes, such as spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). As
shown in Fig.4, in this process, a pump photon spontaneously decays into a pair of daughter
photons in a nonlinear crystal. The conservation of energy and momentum implies that the
generated daughter photons are entangled in spectral and spatial domains. We assume that
the pump pulse has a narrow spectral bandwidth of δνP and a relatively large temporal width
of δtP . We denote the central frequency of the pump pulse by νP . The central frequency of
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FIG. 3: Schematic diagram of the entanglement based FT-QKD system. (a) The EPR source is
placed at Alice’s station; (b) The EPR source is placed between Alice and Bob. EPR-energy-time
entangled source; BS-beam splitter; TSPD-time-resolving single photon detector; DG-dispersive
grating; SPDA-single photon detector array.
FIG. 4: Spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) process
Alice (Bob)’s photon is νA(νB) and its spectral bandwidth is δνA(δνB). Furthermore, Alice
(Bob)’s photon is generated at time tA(tB) with a temporal uncertainty of δtA(δtB).
Note the spectral bandwidths δνA and δνB of the down-converted photons are determined
by the phase matching condition and the actual experimental setup. The following condition
can be satisfied in practice
δνA ∼= δνB ≫ δνP (12)
On the other hand, the temporal widths δtA and δtB of the down-converted photons are
mainly determined by the temporal width δtP of the pump photon
δtA ∼= δtB ∼= δtP (13)
So each individual photon of an EPR pair has both a broad spectral bandwidth and a
large temporal width, as shown in Fig.4. This suggests that when Alice and Bob perform
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time or frequency measurement, individually, they will observe large uncertainties in their
measurement results. However, if Alice and Bob use the same basis, their measurement
results are highly correlated, i.e.
νA + νB ≃ νP (14)
tA ≃ tB (15)
The uncertainty in (14) is determined by the line-width δνP of the pump laser, which
can be less than 10MHz. This corresponds to a wavelength uncertainty in the order of
0.1pm at telecom wavelength (≃ 1550nm). The uncertainty in (15) depends on the spectral
bandwidth δνA of down-converted photon. In practice δνA can be larger than 100GHz, the
corresponding time uncertainty in (15) is less than 10ps. For the detection system, achieving
a temporal resolution better than 10ps or a spectral resolution better than 10pm at single
photon level are very challenge. So we can assume that the conditional variance defined
in (7) is fully determined by the finite temporal and spectral resolutions of the detection
system.
Comparing with the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD protocol based on the complicated
Gaussian modulation scheme, the entanglement based FT-QKD explores the intrinsic
energy-time correlation of an EPR pair. This greatly simplifies the whole QKD system.
Furthermore, in the FT-QKD system shown in Fig.3, no random numbers are needed dur-
ing the quantum transmission stage. This mitigates the requirement for high speed random
number generator [14]. The main technical challenge left is how to achieve high resolution
spectral measurement at single photon level. In Section V, we will discuss two practical
FT-QKD schemes.
V. FEASIBILITY OF THE FT-QKD PROTOCOL
A. The prepare-and-measure FD-QKD protocol with discrete modulation
The FT-QKD protocol shown in Fig.1 can be simplified by using discrete modulation
scheme [15], which is shown in Fig.5.
In this scheme [15], Alice randomly chooses to use either the frequency-basis or the time-
basis to encode her random bit. In the frequency-basis, Alice uses frequency ν1 (ν2) to
encode bit “1” (bit “0”), while in the time-basis, she uses time delay t1 (t2) to encode bit
12
FIG. 5: The basic scheme of the FT-QKD protocol with binary modulation
“1” (bit “0”). At Bob’s end, he randomly measures either the arrival time or the frequency
(wavelength) of each incoming photon. After the quantum transmission stage, Alice and
Bob compare their measurement bases for each transmission and only keep the results when
they happen to use the same basis. If the QBER is low, they could further generate secure
key by performing error correction and privacy amplification.
Intuitively, to make this protocol secure, Alice’s photons in different bases should at least
partially overlap with each other in both time domain and spectral domain, so Eve cannot
distinguish them faithfully. Furthermore, to apply the energy-time uncertainty relation to
bound Eve’s information, the condition of (ν2 − ν1)(t2 − t1) ≤ 1 may be required. This put
some constraints on the minimal resolution of Bob’s detection system.
From implementation point of view, the FT-QKD with binary modulation is attractive.
However, a security proof for this protocol is still missing.
B. A practical entanglement based FT-QKD scheme
Recall that one major technical challenge in the FT-QKD is how to achieve high resolution
spectral measurement at single photon level. One intuitive idea is to use a highly dispersive
element followed by a time resolving SPD. The dispersive element introduces a frequency-
dependent time delay, thus information encoded in spectral domain will be transferred into
time domain. Thus a time resolving SPD can be employed to decode the frequency of the
incoming photon by measuring its arrival time. However, this idea cannot be applied directly.
This is because each individual photon has an intrinsic time uncertainty (for example, in
the order of ns) which cannot be distinguished from the frequency-dependent time delay.
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FIG. 6: Schematic diagram of a practical entanglement based FT-QKD system: EPR-frequency-
time entangled source; BS-beam splitter; F-spectral and temporal filters; DA-dispersive component
with positive dispersion coefficient; DB-dispersive component with negative dispersion coefficient;
TSPD-time-resolving single photon detector.
Fortunately, the two photons in an EPR pair are entangled in both spectral and time domain,
so the intrinsic time uncertainty of each individual photon can be canceled out.
As shown in Fig.6, a dispersive element with a dispersion coefficient of DA (DB) is placed
at Alice (Bob)’s side for frequency measurement. The dispersion coefficients of the two
dispersive elements are chosen to satisfy DB = −DA. By using a suitable time reference,
the detection time TA of Alice’s SPD in frequency-basis is given by
TA = tA +DA(νA − ν0) (16)
where ν0 is the central frequency of the spectral distribution of down-converted photon
from the SPDC source. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the two down-converted
photons from each EPR pair have the same spectral distribution, so ν0 = νP0/2, where νP0
is the central frequency of the pump pulse.
Similarly, Bob’s detection time TB in frequency-basis is given by
TB = tB +DB(νB − ν0) (17)
Using equations (14-17) and the facts that DB = −DA, ν0 = νP0/2, we can see that TA and
TB are highly correlated, i.e. TA − TB ∼= 0 with a small variance.
We remark that the above frequency correlation measurement scheme is the same as the
one proposed by J. D. Franson in nonlocal cancellation of dispersion [16].
As a side note, in (16-17) if we choose DB = DA, then we have TA−TB = DA(νA−νB) =
DA(2νA − νP ). Since DA and νP can be treated as constants, this provides a practical way
to measure the spectrum of down-converted photons from a SPDC source.
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In section III, we connected the arrival time and frequency of a single photon with its
spatial position X and wave vector KX . Similarly, the measurement defined in (16) can be
treated as a measurement of a combination ofX andKX . In general, the above measurement
can be represented by W = aX + bKX , where a and b are nonzero constants. Since the
commutation relation between X and W is the same as the one between X and KX (except
a scale factor), Gottesman-Preskill’s security proof is still applicable.
Fig.6 is a schematic diagram of the entanglement FT-QKD based on this new frequency
measurement scheme. To evaluate its performance, equations (6) and (7) can be used to
calculate the intrinsic QBER. As we have discussed above, the conditional variance (thus the
intrinsic QBER) of the FT-QKD is mainly determined by the finite temporal and spectral
resolutions of the detection system. Specifically, in the entanglement FT-QKD scheme shown
in Fig.6, given the dispersion coefficient of the dispersive elements, the intrinsic QBER is
mainly determined by the time jitter of time resolving SPDs. For example, commercial
dispersion compensation module based on fiber Bragg grating (FBG) technology can provide
a dispersion coefficient as large as Dλ = 7000ps/nm with a moderate loss of 5dB [17]. If
the time resolution of the SPD is 50ps, then the spectral resolution will be about 7pm.
In Fig.6, both Alice’s and Bob’s detection system will make contributions to the mea-
surement variance. If we assume noises from Alice and Bob’s systems are independent and
have identical distribution (i.i.d), then the total variance ∆2 in (6) is given by
∆2 = 2∆X∆K (18)
where ∆2X and ∆
2
K are conditional variances in time-basis and frequency-basis, respectively.
From (8-9), ∆X and ∆K are determined by
∆X =
c
n
∆t (19)
∆K =
2pin
λ2
∆λ =
2pin
λ2Dλ
∆t (20)
We remark that variance ∆2t is defined as 1/e
2, while in practice, time jitter of SPD (δt)
is commonly defined in the fashion of full-width-half-amplitude (FWHA). For a Gaussian
distribution, we have ∆t =
1
2
√
ln 2
δt. Using (18-20), the conditional variance is given by
∆2 =
1
ln 2
pic
λ2Dλ
δ2t (21)
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FIG. 7: Intrinsic QBER of the entanglement FT-QKD protocol. Here we assume λ ≃ 1550nm and
Dλ = 7000ps/nm. The QBER is about 5% for a time jitter of 70ps. The time jitter of a state-
of-the-art superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) can be as small as 40ps [18],
and the resulting intrinsic QBER is about 0.05%. We also show the 11% security bound in the
figure.
Using (6) and (21), we calculate the intrinsic QBER as a function of the time resolution
δt of the SPD. Here, we assume that the QKD system is operated at telecom wavelength
(λ ≃ 1550nm) and the dispersion coefficient Dλ = 7000ps/nm. The simulation results are
show in Fig.7: the QBER is about 5% for a time jitter of 70ps. The time jitter of a state-
of-the-art superconducting nanowire SPD (SNSPD) can be as small as 40ps [18], and the
resulting QBER is about 0.05%.
We remark the secure key rate given by (11) is derived based on perfect single photon
sources (or in the case of entanglement based protocol, there should be no more than one
EPR pair per pump pulse). However, in practice, multiple pairs could be generated by one
pump pulse, so (11) cannot be applied directly. A similar problem has been studied in the
entanglement based BB84 QKD protocol [19], where the SPDC source has been identified
as a basis-independent source thus the security analysis given in [20] can be applied. To
apply the result in [19] to the entanglement based FT-QKD system, an appropriate squash
model of the threshold detector is needed.
In practice, the effective detection window of the QKD system may be limited: in the
time-basis, photons arriving outside of a certain time window may be treated as noise pho-
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tons and be discarded; in the frequency-basis, photons outside of certain spectral range may
not be detected. Eve may take advantage of this imperfection and introduce basis-dependent
detection efficiency. Similar security issues have been studied in the BB84 QKD by, for ex-
ample, time-shift attack [21]. To close this potential loophole, spectral and temporal filters
(represented by F in Fig.6) can be placed at the entrance of the QKD system to make sure
that the incoming photons are within the desired spectral and temporal range.
VI. CONCLUSION
One major advantage of the FT-QKD protocol is its robust against environmental noise:
the frequency/time coding scheme is intrinsically insensitive to the polarization and phase
fluctuations. This could improve the stability of a practical QKD system dramatically. One
may worry about the temporal broadening of a narrow laser pulse due to fiber dispersion.
Fortunately, the dispersion of SMF at telecom wavelength has been thoroughly studied
and various dispersion compensation technologies are available. For example, in [22], after
passing through a 50km fiber, a 460fs pulse was only slightly broaden to 470fs. This is
orders lower than the time resolution of today’s SPD.
In this paper, we establish a security proof of the FT-QKD protocol by showing its
connection to the squeezed state QKD. We also extend the prepare-and-measure FT-QKD
protocol to an entanglement based FT-QKD protocol which is more appealing in practice.
Furthermore, we propose a correlated frequency measurement scheme by using time resolving
SPD. Simulation results show the feasibility of the FT-QKD protocol.
As for future research directions, a rigorous security proof of the FT-QKD based on
binary modulation scheme is highly desired. For the entanglement based FT-QKD, a suitable
squash model for threshold SPDs is required. Furthermore, to fully take advantage of the
continuous variable FT-QKD, a distillation protocol which can generate more than one bit
from each transmission should be developed.
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